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This  paper  reports  work  on  a  model  of  machine  learning  which  is  based 
on   the   psychological   theory   of   prototypical   concepts.     This  theory  is 
that   concepts   learnt   naturally   from   interaction   with   the   environment 
(basic   categories)    are   not   structured   or   defined   in   logical  terms  but 
are   clustered    in   accordance   with   their  similarity   to   a   central   prototype, 
representing  the  "most  typical''  member. 
In  attempting  to  operationalize  this  theory  in  a machine  learning 
programme  it  has  been  necessary  to  study  object  descriptions   of  visual 
data.    This  has  led  to  the  development  of  a  knowledge  representation 
structure   based   on   the   natural  properties  inherent  in  visual  images, 
shape  and  parts.    Methods  developed to  achieve  this  are  discussed. 
The   organisation  of   knowledge  derived  from  this  approach  differs 
fundamentally  from  existing  K:R  formalisms  in  leading  to  a  view  of 
concepts    as    perceptual    structures   at   the   basic   level,with   relations 
between   concepts   being   described   via  a  superordinate  level  of  abstract  concepts. 
This   has   implications   both   for   the  differential  treatment  of  concrete  and 
abstract   concepts  and  in  suggesting  a  feature  based  retrieval  mechanism. 
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This   paper  reports   a  proposed   design   for   a   scheme   of   knowledge 
representation   which  has   evolved    during   work   on   a  machine   learning   system. 
This    scheme    differs    in   many  respects   from  current   rule-based,   semantic   net 
and   frame-based   designs.   The  motivation   for   t h i s    scheme   springs   from  work 
in    progress   to  construct  a  program  with   a   learning   c a p a b i l i t y    in   the   field 
of    object    recognition,    and    in   part icular   at   the   fundamental   level,    that   of 
natural    object    categorization.    The    structure    of    this    paper    is    that   f i r s t l y  
the  background  in   t h i s    work   is   described,   then   the   descr iption  method   for 
encoding  visual   shapes ,   then   the   knowledge   representat ion   scheme   to  which 
we    are    led  by   these   considerat ions.     Finally,   differences   from  e x i s t  ing 
schemes    and    implications    for    psychological    investigations   are   discussed. 
As   this  work   is   s t i l l    in  progress,   many   details   of   the   scheme   are   at 
present   undecided    but    the    general    outline    and    operational    approach   are 
clear    and   will    not    be    significantly    affected   by   whatever    form   the    detailed 
mechanisms    finally    take.      It    is    the    intention    of    this   paper   to  present   and 
provoke   debate    upon    the  underlying  principles   of   t h i s    scheme. 
BACKGROUND
Stimulus   si tuat ions   are   unique   but   living   creatures   do   not 
treat    them  uniquely   -   they   respond   on    the   basis   of  past   learning  and 
categories.     These    categories    are   given   l abe ls    (by   humans)   which   represent 
a    single   mental    concept    for    a l l     individuals   in   that   category,   the 
assumption   being   made   that    the    same    structural    and    processing   principles 
hold    in    both   perceptual   and   conceptual    realms.     Consequently  p a r a l l e l  
theoretical    developments    have    taken    place    in   psychological    research    on 
perceptual    and     conceptual     categorization. 
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          In    contrast    to    most    work    in    AI   to   date,   one   school   of   psychologists 
believes    that   most    natural    concepts    are   ill-def ined,   that    is,   there    is    no 
rule   that   can   determine  membership   for   a l l   members   of   a   category. 
Furthermore,   not   a l l   members   of   a   concept   have   equal   status-  Members 
judged   to  be   typical    of    a   concept    ( e .g .   apples   for   the   concept   'fruit')   can 
be  categorized  faster  and  more  accurately   than  members   judged  less  typical 
(e.g.   tomato).     This   line   of   thought   led   Rosch  et   al   [1]   to   develop 
' p r o t o t y p e '     theories   of   concepts   in  which   membership   of   a   category   is 
determined  by   the   t y p i c a l i t y    of   a  particular   object   to  an   ideal   member   of 
the   concept   which   has   the   average   attributes   of   a l l    c lass   members.     This   is 
not   the   whole   story,   however,   as   any   object   may   be   categorized  at   each   of 
several   different   levels ,   higher   levels   being  abstract   and   lower   levels 
more  d e t a i l e d   and  s p e c i f i c ,   e . g .   a  chair  may  be  c l a s s i f i e d   as  an  inorganic 
o b j e c t ,    a   piece   of   furniture,   a   chair   or   a  kitchen   c h a i r .       These 
psychologists    have    argued    that   the  most   cognitively  e f f i c i e n t    and   therefore 
most    bas ic    level    of   categorizat ion   is   that   level   at   which   the   categories 
produced  provide  the  most  d i s t i n c t   clusters  of   o b j e c t s ,     i .e.     the   level 
which  maximizes  the   s i m i l a r i t y   of   objects   w i t h i n   a   category   and  maximises 
the    differences    between    objects    in   different    categories.     Thus    of    the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s   suggested  for   a   c h a i r ,   the   ba s i c    level   category    is   ' c h a i r '  
because  chairs  are   q u i t e    s i m i l a r    amongst   themselves   and  d i s t  inct   from 
table s ,    tomatoes ,   etc,    whereas    items    of    furniture    are   not   very   s i m i l a r  
amongst   themselves  and  kitchen   cha irs  do   not   d i f f e r    sharp ly   from   other 
chairs.      Tversky   and   Hemingway   [2]   provide   evidence   that   this   bas ic    level 
of   categorization   has   the   following   properties: 
1) it   is   the  most   abstract   level   at   which   instances   have   s i mi l a r  
shapes. 
2) it   is   the  most   abstract   level   at   which   instances   have   s i mi l a r  
parts. 
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3) it   is   the  most  abstract   level   at   which   a  mental   image   can   reflect 
the   appearance   of   the  entire   category. 
4) objects   are   recognized  more  quickly   as  members   of   basic   level 
categories    than   as   members   of    categories    at    other    levels. 
5) it   is   the   level   at   which  humans   spontaneously   name   an  object. 
The   overall   intention   of   the   work   of  which   this   paper   forms   a   part   is   to 
construct   a    model    of    the    categorization   process   which   can   learn  basic   level 
'natural'    categories    from    simple   visual    data   without    ins   truction.     The 
approach   adopted   is   to   produce   a   model   that   operationalizes   the   above 
psychological    findings. 
VISUAL   INPUT  -   SHAPE   DESCRIPTION
The   domain   for   learning   in   t h i s   work  was   chosen   to  be   that   of   2-D 
silhouettes    of    3-D   objec ts ,    such    that    the    difference    between    convex  and 
concave    parts    of    a    silhouette    represents    properties    of    the    3-D    surface    and 
where    the    surface    looks    continuous    in   2-D   it    rea l l y    is   continuous   in  3-D. 
Marr    [3]   shown   that    if   these   conditions   are   met   the   3-D   surface   can   o f t e n  
be    successfully    inferred    from     the     silhouette.       In    limit ing    ourselves    to    this 
domain   we    are    ignoring    various    sources    of    visual    informat ion,   e.g.   colour , 
texture,    depth,    motion,    so   we   might    expect    some    deficiencies   in  what   is 
considered    a    basic    category    ( e . g .    silhouettes    of    oranges    and   apples   are 
very    similar    although    they    form    different    basic    level    categories). 
However,    these    properties    could   e a s i l y     be    incorporated   within   the   knowledge 
representation    scheme    to    be    proposed,    and    the   key  properties   of  basic 
categories,  those  of   shape   and   p a r t s ,    w i l l    remain   the   same   if   we   are 
judicious    in   our    choice    of    projections.     For    these    reasons   it   was   thought 
reasonable    to    explore    learning    and    representation    in   the   2-D  domain  which 
is   much    easier    to   handle    as    regards    object    description   and    segmentation. 
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Shapes    and    parts    seem   a    good    starting   point    for    visual- 
categorization,   both   on   the   psychological   grounds   advanced   previously    and 
intuitively.     They    are    therefore    taken  as   the   fundamental   descriptors   of 
visual    object    perceptions.        This   raises    the   question  of   precisely   what   is 
meant   by    'parts ' .  Marr's   research   in  machine  vision   has   taken   the   view 
that   objects   are  most   naturally  segmented   into   convex  parts  [3]  and  we   have 
followed  this   line  of  thought   but  refined  it   so  that   parts   need  only   be 
'psuedo-convex'  in  the  sense   that   further   dividing   than   into  more   convex 
subparts   does   not   significantly   increase   the   measure   of   convexity.   This 
approach   is   reported  elsewhere   in  more   detail    [4].  The  effect   is 
i l l u s t r a t e d   by   the   resulting   'parts'  of   a  horse  in   FIG  1. 
The   description   of   the   visual   image   of  a   horse   is   achieved   in 
stages.   F i r s t l y ,    the   horse   is   described   h o l i s t i c a l l y   by   a   set   of 
descriptors    including    such   measures    as    principal   ax i s ,    axis   extension 
r a t i o ,    compactness   (perimeter/area),   s i z e ,    e t c . ,    applied   to   the   whole 
image    [5].     The   precise   set   of   descriptors   used   is  unimportant   as   long  as 
it   contains   a   rough  description   of   the   shape.      Only   a   rough   description   is 
necessary  as  more   accurate   descr iptions   are   provided   by    successive    stages. 
At  the  second  stage  the  horse  is  decomposed   as   in  FIG  1   into   its   primary 
subparts.   Each   subpart   is   now  described   by   the   same   set   of   descriptors, 
and   the   relative   position   of   each   subpart   is   a l so    stored.     This   process   is 
now  repeated   to   any  desired   number  of  s t ages ,   the  subparts  being 
successively    divided   and   described    in   increasing  detail.    The   result   is   a 
hierarchial    description   as    in    FIG   2. 
The   level   of   detail   in  which   a   given   object   is   analysed  would  be 
determined    sequentially.    If    it    can   be   recognized   at    the    h o l i s t i c     level 
there     is    no   need    for   any   decomposition    into   parts.     Decomposition  continues 
until   the   object   can   be   recognized   or   until   the   attempt    is   given  up. 
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KNOWLEDGE   REPRESENTATION
Evolut ionari l y  ,   the   e a r l i e s t    forms   of   nervous   systems   are   reflex 
systems    giving    a    'hard-wired'    response     to    a    recognized    stimulus. 
Evolutionary    development    has   resulted    in    the    change   from   a   fixed   response 
to   a   more    flexible    knowledge-based    response,   but    it    seems    reasonable   to 
asume    that    knowledge    representation    structures    developed    e a r l i e r     in 
connection   with    recognition    provide     the    basic    forms   for    the    later 
representat ion   of   knowledge   of   other   types .      We   therefore   cons ider   the 
representation    needed    for     the    efficient    categorization    of    visual    data    and 
extend   this   form   of   storage   to   other   levels   of   thought . 
Given   that   the   incoming   data   is   primarily   encoded   in   terms   of 
part/shape    hierarchies    as    out 1ined    in    the    previous    section,    recognit ion 
must    be    achieved    by   matching   t h i s    against   stored   representations   of 
recognizable   categorie s.     The  most   d i r e c t    way   to   achieve   t h i s    is   for   the 
category   representations    in   memory    to   be    structured    in   the   same   way. 
However,    different    horses    have    slightly    different    shapes    and    it     Is    clearly 
inefficient    to    store    a    representation    of    every   horse    ever   seen.     A  more 
e f f i c i e n t   approach   would   be  to  s t o r e    a    ' typical '   or   'average'   horse 
representation,   and   look   for   a   reasonably   c lose   match   to   t h i s .       Such   an 
'averaged'    description    only   makes    sense    if    the    instances    being  averaged   are 
sufficiently   perceptually    similar    and    if    the   descript ions    do    not    descend    to 
a    level    of   d e t a i l    where   large   differences   appear.     e . g .    it   is   possible   to 
v i s u a l i z e    an   'average'    banana   but   not   an   'average'    f r u i t .   Further,    the 
search   tree   of   stored   representations   can   be   more   e f f i c i e n t l y    searched   the 
e a r l i e r    it   begins  branching,   i .e .    if   these   averaged    representations   are 
representative   of   a   large   a   c lass  of   instances   as   poss ib le .  Thus  for 
recognition   efficiency   we   would    expect    stored  hierarchical    shape/part 
descriptions  with    ' t y p i c a l '  or  'averaged’  measure   values   to   be   formed   at 
the  maximum   level   of   generality   consistent   with   such   averages   being 
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representative    of    t h e i r     instances,      Being    representative    of    their    instances 
means   that   within  a  category   the   instances   c l u s t e r    c lose ly   around   the 
average   compared   to   the ir   distances   from  other   categories .     Thus   the 
categories  will   be   as   d i s t i n c t    as   possible   subject   to   t h e i r    averages   making 
perceptual   sense.      It   follows   t h a t    we   expect   the   structure   of   this 
knowledge   representat ion   scheme   at   the   immediate   recognit ion   level   to 
d i s p l a y   the  properties  of  R o s e n ' s  bas ic  level .  
These  arguments  sugges t   t h a t   there  is   a  bas i c   level of   knowledge 
representation    at    which    i n i t i a l     recognition   is   accomplished.     It   c o n s i s t s  
of    prototypical    representations    which    are    'averages'    of   category   members 
and   structured  as   in   FIG   2.      In   order   to   be   maximally   general,   these 
prototypes   are   not   very   s p e c i f i c ,     i .e .    contain  a   relat ively   small   degree   of 
decompos i t ion   and   thus  of  detail .Proposed  mechanisms   by   which  these 
prototyp ical    categories    might    be   formed   ( l e a r n t )    are    reported   elsewhere 
[6]. 
Within    the   knowledge   representation   scheme    it    is   a l s o    necessary   to 
accomplish  more   s p e c i f i c    recognition   by   use   of  more   d e t a i l e d    information 
than    is    required   at    the    i n i t i a l    prototype  matching   s t a g e .       In  keeping  with 
our  e a r l i e r    remarks   on   r e c o g n i t i o n    level   organizations   providing   the   form 
for    representing   other   knowledge ,   and   in   keeping   with    Rosch's    results 
[1],   we   assume   that   structure   for   recognizing  more   s p e c i f i c    c a t e g o r i e s ,  
e.g..   kitchen   c h a i r ,   r e p l i c a t e s   t h a t    at   b a s i c   l eve l .  Thus   w i t h i n    the   class 
of   objec ts   assigned    to   a   given   bas ic   category,   e . g .     ' h o r s e ',   more   d e t a i l e d  
prototyp ical    images    are    formed,   each    representing    a   smaller    class    of 
i n s t a n c e s     than   ' h o r s e '   but    again   the   prototypes   be ing   constructed   to   form 
classes   of   maximum    generality   and    d i s t i n c t n e s s    subject    to   the    'averages' 
being    representative    at    t h i s    more    detailed    level .      ' Horse'    at    bas ic    level 
might   be    s t o r e d   simply   in   terms   of   possessing   a   body,    neck,   head,   4    legs, 
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tail   and   their   rough   shapes.     At   a   subordinate   level   'Racehorse'   might   have 
different    shape    descriptors    for   these   parts   and   be   further   decomposed,   e.g. 
leg   into  upper   leg,    lower   leg  and  hoof.    Since   the   shape   measures   of 
'racehorse’   are   not    the    same  as   those   of   'horse1    in  the   parts   they   both 
include    in    their    hierarchies,   e .g .    body ,    the   subordinate   levels    are   not 
simply   lower  branches   on   the  bas i c    level   tree.  ( I f    they  were,   we  would 
have   to   identify    'racehorse'    only   from   i t s    details   e .g.    hoof   shape, 
ignoring   differences   in   larger   parts   such   as   i t s    body   shape).     Instead   the 
structure   consists   of    successive   levels   of    prototypes,   e a c h    prototype   being 
stored   as   a   hierarchical   decomposition   into   parts   and   shapes,   with   the 
number  of   stages  of  decompos it ion  and  the  s p e c i f i c i t y  of  the  measures 
becoming   greater   at   each   subordinate   level   of   prototype,   FIG   3. 
With   th is   struc ture   recognit ion   is   achieved   in   stages.      F i r s t ly   a 
categorization   is   made   at   the   basic   l evel ,    by  matching   the   object 
representation    against    the    stored   prototypes.      Secondly   categorizat ion   is 
made  at   the  f i r s t    subordinate  level   by  matching   the   object   representation 
against    prototypes   of    categories   directly   subordinate   to   the   recognized 
basic  level  category.  This  process  may   be  repeated  until   a    sufficiently 
specific  categorizat ion  has   been   reached. 
   In   this   scheme    there    is   no   inheritance   of    features    from   a   higher 
level   e.g.   horse   to   a   lower    level    e .g .       racehorse .      Instead   there    is   a 
separate    complete    prototypical     representation    on    each    level.       However,     this 
does    not    duplicate    storage    requirements,    since    as    previously   mentioned,    the 
descriptor  measures  of    ' h o r se '   ,  applying    to   a   wider   se t    of   instances   than 
'racehorse' ,    are    di fferent.     This    separate    prototypes    structure    has    the 
additional   advantage   that   once   an   object   has   been   categorized  as   a   horse,   a 
quick  check  on  which   subordinate  category  it   f i t s   may  be  made  by  checking 
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only   the    i n i t i a l    levels   of   the   subordinate   prototypes   against   the    object. 
If    recognizable   differences    e x i s t    between   subordinate   prototypes   at   these 
initial    levels    of   decomposition,    it   is   not   necessary   to   check   the   complete 
decoraposit ion  of   the   prototype   at   this   level. 
The   questions   of   how  matching   is   evaluated  between   object   and 
prototype    representations    and    of    how   to    order   searches   through   the 
prototype   space   are   present   topics   of   i n v e s t i g a t i o n .       Because   of   their 
nature   as   'averages'   only   a   ' c lose '    match   can  be   expected  between 
representations.      Thus    a   measure    of    similarity    between    representations    is 
required.  Such   a  measure   induce s   both   a   'degree   of   membership'   of   an 
o b j e c t   in  a  category  and  a  set  of   s i m i l a r i t y   relations   between   the 
prototypes.  These  l a t t e r    could   be   used   in  a   technique   such   as 
multidimensional   scaling    [7]    to   induce   a   low  dimensional   ordering   on   the 
prototype   space   which   might   be   used,   together   with   context-driven 
c o n s t r a i n t s    on   lilcely   prototypes ,   to  des i gn   an   ordered   search  procedure . 
So   far  we   have   dealt   with   knowledge   representation   from   the   bas ic  
level    down.     Above    the    basic    level    there    are   more    abstract   superordinate 
levels.     At   these   levels,   a   category,   e.g.   fruit,   cannot   be   represented  by 
a    prototype    and    therefore    has    no   representation  as  a   decomposition   into 
parts  and   shapes.  The  established  pattern  of   clusters  of  instances 
according   to   within   c l u s t e r    simil a r i t y    and   between   cluster   differences  must 
there  fore    be    based   on   relat ionsh ips   other   than   overall   perceptual 
s i m i l a r i t y . In  l i n e   with   t h i s   t h e s e   a b s t r a c t    categories   are   taken   to 
c o n s i s t    of   sets   of   concrete   prototypes.     Thus    ' f r u i t '    consists   of   'apple', 
' o r a n g e ' ,     'pear',   e t c . ,    and   the    similarity   relations   might    include    ' e a t e n  
by  a n i m a l s ' ,  'grows  on  p l a n t s ' ,  ' j u i c y ' .  In  general  the  s i m i l a r i t y  
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relations   might    be    perceptual   as   in   'furry  animals',   based  on  actions   or 
uses  as  in  ' e a t e n   by  animals'  or  based  on   emotional  or  cognit ive   e f f e c t s  as 
in   'beautiful   flowers',    'intended   for   storage'.  
For   such   similarity  relations   to  be   u t i l i z e d    it   is   necessary   to 
revise    our   picture    of   basic   and    subordinate   leve1   categories   to   include 
with     their     prototypical     perceptual    descriptions    a l so   prototypical 
information   on    their   uses ,    actions,     interact ions,    emotional    inplications, 
cognitive   implications    and   any    other    important   non-perceptual   effects. 
Categorizat ion  on   the  basis   of  non-perceptual   features   is   aided  by 
the  existence  of   episodic  memory,   storing   time   sequence   descriptions   of 
recognized    o b j e c t s ,     their   physical    interactions   and   the   observer's   feelings 
and   inferences   about   them   [8 ] .      At   these   abstract   levels   of   categorization 
there   is   no   natural   division   into   d i s t i n c t    categories   corresponding   to   the 
natural   division    into   prototypical    categories    at    basic   level,   and   so   the 
abstract   classes   formed   are   e s s e n t i a l l y   arbitrary.     They  will   be   formed  and 
survive  as  part  of  the  knowledge   structure   depending   on   their  u s e f u l n e s s ,  
which   is   in  associating   input   data  w i t h    inferences  and  actions,   since 
rule-type  knowledge  is  most   e f f i c i e n t l y   stored  and  used  when  represented  in 
terms   of   the  most   general   categor ies   to  which   it   applies.     Thus   the 
abstract  categories   formed  w i l l    depend  upon   the   environment,  the d e c i s io n  
processes   being   used  and   on   feedback   received 
The  complete  picture   of  knowledge  representation  for   categories   at 
all   levels   is   now  given   in   FIG  4. 
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Note   chat    in    a   sense   the   abstract    categories   do    not    have    any 
content.     They   are   merely    a   collection   of  pointers    to  concrete   prototypes. 
Also,   just   as   at   the   basic   level   some   instances   are   closer   to   the   prototype 
and  thus  have  a  greater  degree   of  membership   of   the   category   than  others, 
some  concrete  prototypes  w i l l   have  a  greater  degree  of   membership  in  an 
abstract   category   than   others. 
DISCUSSION
The   knowledge   representation   scheme   for   categories   outlined   in   this 
paper   contrasts   in  many  respects   with   existing   schemes   [9 ,    10].      F i r s t l y ,  
there    is    no    logical    definition   of    categories.     All    categories    in    this 
scheme    consist    of    clusters    of    instances   or   clusters   of   prototypes.     An 
instance   may  have   a   greater   or   lesser   degree   of  membership   of   a   category, 
but   there   is   no   sharp   division  between  members   and   non-members.     This 
implies    that    the   use    of    logical    deduction   as   a   reasoning  mechanism  with 
such   a   scheme  must   be   very   limited   if   used   at   a l l .  Secondly,   the 
representat ion   structure   is   not   hierarchical .      The   use    of    terms    like 
superordinate   and   subordinate   levels   is    merely    illustrat ive;      there    is   no 
inheritance   of  propert ies   from  more   abstract   to   less    abstract    levels.     Each 
category   comes   complete  with  i t s   own  properties   represented   in   its 
prototype   or,    for   abstract   categories,    its   set   of   prototypes.     Thus   in 
recognition   an   object    is   not   recognized   as    f i r s t l y    animal,    then   fish   and 
then  goldfish   but   instead   f i r s t l y    at   the   basic   l eve l ,     say    fish,   and    then 
depending    on    need,   as   goldfish   or   animal.     Thirdly,    the    nature    of    abstract 
categories    or    col lections    of    prototypes   means    that    thinking   about    such 
categories   will   automatically  be    in    terms   of    concrete     'examples'    of    the 
abstract    category,    the    prototypes.      This    accords   with    the   exemplar  view  of 
categories    [11].      Fourthly,    there    is    not    necessarily    a   one   to  one 
correspondence    between    the    categories    (concepts)    in    the    representation 
scheme   and  verbal   labels   for   concepts.   For   example,   a   penguin  and  a 
11 
sparrow  will   not   be   in   the   same   prototype   class   at   basic   level ,   since   they 
do  not   look  alike.     Thus   there   are   at   l e a s t    two   ba s i c    level   categories 
'penguins'    and    'ordinary   birds',   say.     However,  most    people   would   say   that 
both   a   penguin   and  a   sparrow  are    'birds'.      Thus    'birds'    is   a   superordinate 
(abstract)   category   to  which   the   verbal   label   corresponds,   but   there 
appears   to   be   no  verbal   label   ordinarily   used   for   the    'ordinary   birds' 
category.      Since   superordinate   categories   are   different   in  nature   from 
basic   and   subordinate   ones ,   psychological   experiments   treating   'bird'   on 
the   same   level   as  'penguins'  may  be  treating  separate  measures   of 
similarity   as   identical,   e .g .  Tversky  &   Smith   [ l 2 ]    compare   similarities 
between   different  sorts   of   fruits   such   as   cherry,  a p p l e ,    etc.,   with   the 
similarities  between  cherry  and  fruit,apple  and  fruit, etc. 
This   knowledge   representation   scheme   has   been   based   on   considerations 
of    the    fundamental     cognitive   processes,    categorization    and    recognition.       It 
does  not  attempt    to  deal  with   advanced   reasoning   processes   which   have 
formed   the   model   for  mos t   existing   schemes. 
For   some   specific   reasoning   tasks   this   structure   will   seem 
inefficient,    and    the    prototypical    organizat ion    in   some   ways   carr ies 
redundant   information.   However,   redundancy   implies   f l e x i b i l i t y    which   is 
certainly    needed   in   a   general   knowledge   representation   scheme.      If,    as   is 
usual    in    evolut ionary    biology,     cognitive     structures   developed    earlier   for 
fundamental   purposes  are  found   to  form  the  bas i s   of   more   advanced 
processes,    it   is   necessary   that   any  model   of   human   reasoning   should  be 
compatible    with    an   underlying    categorizat ion    structure .     It   is   hoped   that 
this   paper   will   serve   the   purpose   of   ini t i a t  ing.   debate   on   this  underlying 
structure   and   its   implications    for  more   advanced   reasoning. 
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